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Abstract
In the classical approach to asymmetric information, agents are all endowed
with a price model a la Radner (Econometrica 47: 655-678, 1979). That is, they
are assumed to know exactly how equilibrium prices are determined and would only
infer information from markets with reference to that price model. Radner (1979)
showed that, under asymmetric information, equilibrium only existed generically
in this setting. We now drop that so-called "rational expectation" assumption and
study the existence of nancial equilibrium when assets are numeraire. We show the
existence of equilibrium is, then, characterized by the no-arbitrage condition on -
nancial markets, as in De Boisde¤re (Econ Theory 31: 255-269, 2007), where assets
are nominal. This result extends Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis(Essays in Honnor of
K.J. Arrow, Starr & Starrett ed., Cambridge UP Vol. 3, 65-96, 1986) to the case of
asymmetric information. Contrasting with Radners, it shows that symmetric and
asymmetric information economies can be treated as two applications of a same
model, where they share similar properties.
Key words: general equilibrium, asymmetric information, arbitrage, existence.
JEL Classication: D52.
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1 Introduction
When agents are asymmetrically informed, they may infer information from ob-
serving prices or trade volumes on markets. A traditional approach to that problem
is given by Radners (1979) rational expectation assumption, along which agents
have a modelor expectationsof how equilibrium prices are determined. Agents
may then infer private information of other agents from comparing actual prices and
price expectations with their theoretical values at a price revealing equilibrium. As
is well known since Radner (1979), this demanding assumption is only consistent
with the generic existence of equilibrium under asymmetric information.
In the existing literature, the full existence property of equilibrium may only hold
on nancial markets where agents are symmetrically informed, and in the two cases
of nominal assets, as demonstrated by Cass (1984), and numeraire assets, along
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986). When assets are real, equilibrium may fail
to exist, as shown by Hart (1975), even with symmetric information.
Assuming that agents have no price model a la Radner, Cornet and De Boisde¤re
(2002) introduce basic tools, concepts and properties for an arbitrage theory, em-
bedding jointly the symmetric and asymmetric information settings, into the same
model. De Boisde¤re (2007) proves that a nancial equilibrium with nominal assets
exists, in this model, not only generically - as with rational expectations - but un-
der the same no-arbitrage condition, whether agents had symmetric or asymmetric
information. This no-arbitrage condition characterizes the existence of equilibrium,
as already known in the symmetric informaton case, since Cass (1984).
Cornet and De Boisde¤re (2009) show that agents endowed with no price model
can still infer enough information, from observing trade, to preclude arbitrage from
1
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purely nancial markets. Whence inferred, this arbitrage-free information structure
can no longer be rened. It is always consistent with the existence of equilibrium,
along De Boisde¤re (2007), but equilibrium prices convey no additional information.
We now show the no-arbitrage condition may also characterize the existence of
nancial equilibrium on numeraire asset markets. This result, which departs from
the Radner classical outcome, extends the standard Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis
(1986) theorem of symmetric information to the asymmetric case.
With asymmetric information, nothing guarantees a positive lower bound to the
value of the numeraire across states at clearing market prices. Yet, this condition
is required to bound attainable transfers. A specic paper was, hence, needed to
show how attainable transfers could be bounded with numeraire assets. Indeed,
De Boisde¤re (2007) only uses the no-arbitrage condition to bound such transfers,
which is no longer possible with numeraire assets. To solve the problem, we now
introduce a specic price set and compactness argument (see Claim 1, below), which
applies to standard preferences, under symmetric information (Remark 3), and to
ordered separable preferences, under asymmetric information. The proof is detailed
in the latter setting, which is the more general and the papers purpose. Searching
a counterexample to existence, or new xed-point arguments, goes beyond.
Formally, the model we present is a two-period pure exchange economy, where
agents, possibly asymmetrically informed, face uncertainty, at the rst period, on
which state of nature will randomly prevail tomorrow, out of a nite state space.
Agents may exchange consumption goods on spot markets, and securities on nan-
cial markets, which pay o¤ in numeraire, i.e., in a given commodity (bundle).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and its existence
Theorem and Section 3 proves the Theorem.
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2 The basic model
We consider a pure-exchange nancial economy with two periods, t 2 f0; 1g, -
nitely many agents, i 2 I := f1; :::;mg, commodities, l 2 f1; :::; Lg, states of nature,
s 2 S, and assets, j 2 f1; :::; Jg, which pay o¤ in numeraire, that is, in a xed com-
modity bundle, henceforth denoted by e 2 RL+. Agents face uncertainty at the rst
period (t = 0) about which state, s 2 S, will prevail at the second period (t = 1). We
let s = 0 be the unique state at t = 0 and 0 := f0g [ , for any subset   S.
At t = 0, each agent, i 2 I, receives a private signal, or information set Si  S,
which correctly informs her that an arbitrary state, s 2 Si, will prevail at t = 1. The
set collection, (Si), represents agentsinformation structure. We assume costlessly
that [mi=1Si = S, and denote by S := \mi=1Si agentspooled information set.
We shall present, successively, the notations that will be used throughout, the
asset market, the commodity market and the concept of equilibrium.
2.1 The notations
Throughout, we denote by R+ the set of non-negative real numbers, and R++ the
subset of strictly positive numbers. We denote, for every SJ real-matrix, V , and
vector pair (p; q) 2 (RL)S0RJ , for every subset   S0, every state, s 2 , and all pairs
(l; j) 2 f1; :::; Lgf1; :::; Jg, (x; x0) 2 (RL)S0RS0 , (y; y0) 2 RR and (z; z0) 2 (RL)(RL):
1) ys, zs, respectively, the scalar and vector, indexed by s 2 , of y and z;
2) zls 2 R the lth component of zs 2 RL;
3) z  z0 the vector (zs  z0s) 2 R and y  z the vector (yszs) 2 (RL);
4) x[] and x0[], respectively, the truncations of x on (RL) and of x0 on R;
5) Vs the row vector indexed by s 2 , of V , and vjs its jth component;
3
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6) V [] (whenever 0 =2 ) the  J matrix dened by V []s := Vs for each s 2 ;
7) W [; q] (whenever 0 =2 ) the 0  J matrix dened by W [; q]0 :=  q and
W [; q]s := Vs, for every s 2 . We also let W (q) := W [S; q];
8) V [; p] (whenever 0 =2 ) the  J matrix dened by V [; p]s := (ps  e)Vs, for
each s 2 , recalling that e 2 RL is the numeraire. We also let V (p) := V [S; p];
9) W [; p; q] (whenever 0 =2 ) the 0  J matrix dened by W [; p; q]0 :=  q and
W [; p; q]s := V (p)s, for every s 2 . We also let W (p; q) := W [S; p; q].
2.2 The nancial market
The nancial market permits limited transfers across periods and states, via J
numeraire assets j 2 f1; :::; Jg, whose contingent payo¤s, in each state s 2 S, are
denoted by vjs e, where e 2 RL+nf0g is the numeraire, or commodity bundle (kek = 1
for simplicity), and vjs is a state-dependent quantity. These quantities, dened for
each (s; j) 2 S  f1; :::; Jg, yield a S  J matrix V := (vjs), which is of full column-
rank (i.e., J = rankV ) and known by all agents. Thus, for all price, p 2 (RL)S0 , the
quantities ps  e vjs, for each (s; j) 2 Sf1; :::; Jg, dene a S  J price-dependent payo¤
matrix V (p) := ( ps e vjs ), in units of account, which is of full column-rank, whenever
ps  e > 0 for each s 2 S. Given the asset price, q 2 RJ , a portfolio is a vector, z 2 RJ ,
which costs qz units of account at t = 0, and delivers a ow, V z, of contingent payo¤s
in numeraire, across states, at t = 1. We now dene the no-arbitrage condition.
Denition 1 A price, q 2 RJ , is said to be a common no-arbitrage price of the struc-
ture (Si), or (Si) to be q-arbitrage-free, if the following Condition holds:
(a) @(i; z; p) 2 I  RJ  (RL)S : W [Si; p; q]z > 0 and ps  e > 0;8s 2 S.
The structure (Si) is said to be arbitrage-free if the set of common no-arbitrage prices
of (Si), denoted by Qc[(Si)], is non-empty.
4
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Remark 1 It follows from Cornet-De Boisde¤re (2009), Theorem 3, that agents
endowed with no price model can always infer an arbitrage-free renement of their
information structure, from observing trade opportunities on nancial markets. For
this reason, we henceforth assume, at no cost, that (Si) is arbitrage-free.
2.3 The commodity market
Commodities may be traded on spot markets, or consumed, at both dates. The
generic agent, i 2 I, has (RL+)S
0
i for consumption set, an endowment, ei 2 (RL+)S
0
i , and
preferences represented by a utility function, ui : (RL+)S
0
i ! R. To set a positive lower
bound to the value of the numeraire in any state in Section 3, we assume there exist
indexes, vsi : R2+ ! R (for s 2 Si), such that ui(x) :=
P
s2Si v
s
i (x0; xs), for all x 2 (RL+)S
0
i .
Given prices, (p; q) 2 (RL)S0RJ , all agents, i 2 I, have for budget sets and set of
attainable strategies, respectively:
Bi(Si; p; q) := f (x; z) 2 (RL+)S
0
i  RJ : p[S0i]  (x-ei) 6W (Si; p; q)z g;
A := f(xi) 2 mi=1(RL+)S
0
i :
Pm
i=1 (xi   ei)[S0] = 0g.
2.4 Equilibrium
The economy described above for a given payo¤ matrix, V , and structure, (Si),
of information signals, Si  S, which each agent, i 2 I, receives (or infers) privately,
is denoted by E = ((ui; ei; Si)i2I ; V ). Its equilibrium concept is as follows:
Denition 2 A price and strategy collection, ((p; q); [(xi ; zi )]) 2 (RL)S
0RJ(mi=1Bi(Si; p; q)),
is an equilibrium of the economy E = ((ui; ei; Si)i2I ; V ) if the following Conditions hold:
(a) 8i 2 I; xi 2 arg maxui(x) for (x; z) 2 Bi(Si; p; q);
(b)
Pm
i=1 (x

i   ei)[S0] = 0;
(c)
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0.
5
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Remark 2 We have assumed, to simplify, that agents had the same anticipations
of all spot prices. Indeed, all the models denitions and results hold if agents have
idiosyncratic price anticipations in the unrealizable states (i.e., s 2 SnS).
The above economy is called standard if it meets the following Assumptions:
Assumption A1 (non satiation in the numeraire in any state):
8(i; x; s) 2 I(RL+)S
0
iS0i; ui(x+es) > ui(x), where es 2 (RL+)S
0
i , es[fsg] = e, es[S0infsg] = 0;
Assumption A2 (strong survival): 8i 2 I; ei 2 (RL++)S
0
i ;
Assumption A3 (continuity):
8i 2 I; 8x 2 (RL+)S
0
i ; 8" > 0; 9 > 0 : [ y 2 (RL+)S
0
i and ky   xk <  ] =) jui(y)  ui(x)j < ";
Assumption A4 (strict quasi-concavity):
8i 2 I; 8(x; y; ) 2 (RL+)S
0
i  (RL+)S
0
i]0; 1[; ui(x+ (y   x)) > min(ui(x); ui(y)).
From Claim 1 in De Boisde¤re (2007), the existence of the above equilibrium
requires (Si) to be arbitrage-free (as assumed). That condition also insures existence:
Theorem 1 A standard economy, E = ((ui; ei; Si)i2I ; V ), admits an equilibrium.
3 The existence proof
The proof results from three Claims, which refer to the sets dened hereafter.
Zoi := fz 2 RJ : Vs  z = 0;8s 2 Sig and Zo?i , its orthogonal, for each i 2 I;
Zo :=
Pm
i=1 Z
o
i and Zo? = \i2IZo?i , its orthogonal.
We set as given " 2]0; 1L [ and let:
 := fp 2 (RL)S0 : kpsk 6 1; 8s 2 S0; pls > ";8(l; s) 2 f1; :::; Lg  SnSg ;
Q := fq 2 Zo? : kqk 6 1g and  := Q
6
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 := fp 2  : ps  e > ;8s 2 Sg and  :=  Q, for every  2]0; "[;
P := fp 2  : ps 2 Ps;8s 2 Sg, where, for each s 2 S,
Ps := f ps2RL; kpsk = 1 : (9i2I; 9(xi)2A; s:t:
2664 (y 2 (RL+)S
0
i ; (y   xi)[S0infsg] = 0 and ui(y) > ui(xi))
=) ( ps  ys > ps  xis > ps  eis )
g.
Finally, denoting by l the vector of RS0 whose components are all equal to one,
we consider, for each i 2 I and every (p; q) 2 , the following strategy sets:
Bi(p; q) := f (x; z) 2 (RL+)S
0
i  Zo?i : p[S0i]  (x-ei) 6W (Si; p; q)z+ l [S0i] g;
A(p; q) := f [(xi; zi)] 2 mi=1Bi(p; q) : (xi) 2 A;
Pm
i=1 zi 2 Zo g.
Claim 1 For the above sets, the following Assertions hold:
(i) P is a compact set;
(ii) 9  2 ]0; "[ : P  ;
(iii) 9r > 0 : [(p; q) 2  and [(xi; zi)] 2 A(p; q)] =) [
Pm
i=1(kxik+ kzik) < r];
(iv) 9r > r : [(p; q) 2 , [(xi; zi)] 2 A(p; q) and kzik 6 r; 8i 2 I] =) [
Pm
i=1(kxik+kzik) < r].
Proof of Claim 1-(i) Let s 2 S and a converging sequence fpkgk2N := f(pks)s2S0gk2N
of elements of P be given. Since  is closed, p = limk!1 pk belongs to  and satises
ps := limk!1 pks . We may assume there exist i 2 I and a sequence, fxkgk2N := f(xki )gk2N,
of elements of A, converging to some x := (xi) in the closure of A in mi=1(R+[f+1g)LS
0
i ,
such that, for each k 2 N, (pks ; i; xk) satises the conditions of the denition of Ps.
We let the reader check, as standard, from market clearance conditions, that the
sequence, fxk[S0]gk2N := f(xki [S0])gk2N, is bounded, hence, x[S0] := (xi[S0]) is nite.
For every k 2 N, let exk := (exki ) 2 A be dened (for each i 2 I) by exki [f0; sg] := xi[f0; sg]
and exki [Sinfsg] := xki [Sinfsg]. Then, the relations pks  (xki  ei)s > 0, for every k 2 N, yield,
in the limit, ps  (exki   ei)s := ps  (xi   ei)s > 0. We now show there exists k 2 N, such
7
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that (ps; i; exk) satises the conditions of the denition of Ps (hence, ps := lim pks 2 Ps).
By contraposition, assume the contrary, i.e., for each k 2 N, there exists yk 2 (RL+)S
0
i ,
such that yk[S0infsg] = exki [S0infsg], ui(yk) > ui(exki ) (that is, vsi (xi0; yks ) > vsi (xi0; xis)) and
ps(yk-xi)s<0. Then, given k 2 N, there exists (from Assumption A3 and separability)
K > k, such that, for every k0 > K, ui(yk) > ui(xk
0
i ). The latter relations imply, by
construction of each xk0 (for k0 > K), pk0s  (yk-xk
0
i )s > 0, hence, in the limit (k0!1),
ps(yk   xi)s > 0, contradicting the inequality, ps(yk   xi)s < 0, assumed above. This
contradiction proves that ps 2 Ps, hence, Ps and P are closed, therefore, compact. 
Proof of Claim 1-(ii) Let s 2 S and p 2 P be given. We prove, rst, that
ps  e > 0. Indeed, let (ps; i; x) 2 Ps  I  A meet the conditions of the denition of
Ps. From Assumption A2, there exists ai 2 (RL+)S
0
i such that, ai[S0infsg] := 0, and
ps  ais < ps  eis 6 ps  xis. Then, for every n > 1, we let xni := ( 1nai + (1  1n )xi) 2 (RL+)S
0
i ,
which satises ps(xni  xi)s < 0 by construction. Referring to AssumptionsA1-A3 and
their notations, there exists n > 1, such that y := (xni + (1  1n )es) satises u(y) > u(xi),
which implies, ps xis 6 ps ys = ps  (xnis+(1  1n )e) < ps xis+(1  1n )ps e. Hence, ps e > 0,
that is, ps  e > 0, for every pair (p; s) 2 PS. The mapping ' : PS! R++, dened by
'(p; s) := pse is continuous and attains its minimum for some element (p; s) on the
compact set PS. Then,  = '(p; s) satises P  , which proves Claim 1-(ii). 
Proof of Claim 1-(iii)-(iv) The proofs of Assertions (iii) and (iv) are similar to
those of Lemma 1, p. 266, in De Boisde¤re (2007), to which we refer the reader. 
We let r > 0 and r > 0 be given, along Claim 1, and, for every (i; (p; q)) 2 I :
Xi := fx 2 (RL+)S
0
i : kxk 6 rg and Zi := fz 2 Zo?i : kzk 6 rg;
Bi(p; q) := Bi(Si; p; q) \ (Xi  Zi);
A(p; q) := f[(xi; zi)] 2 mi=1Bi(p; q): (xi) 2 A; (
Pm
i=1 zi) 2 Zog.
8
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Claim 2 The economy, E= ((ui; ei; Si)i2I ; V ), admits prices, (p; q) 2 , such that
kpsk = 1, for each s 2 S, and strategies, [(xi ; zi)] 2 A(p; q), such that, for each i 2 I,
xi is optimal in Bi(p; q), that is, xi 2 arg maxui(x) for (x; z) 2 Bi(p; q).
Proof The proof is given in De Boisde¤re (2007), under Claims 3 to 13, pp. 262-
266. Indeed, for every pair (i; (p; q)) 2 I, all latter Claimsproofs apply to the above
sets Xi, Zi, Bi(p; q), A(p; q), and subsequent denitions used in De Boisde¤re (2007).
Whenever information is asymmetric, admissible prices may also be restricted to
any subset of , setting xed the value, p[SnS] 2 (RL++)SnS, of commodity prices. 
We, henceforth, set as given (p; q) 2  and ([xi ; zi]) 2 A(p; q), along Claim 2,
and let (z0i) 2 mi=1Zoi be such that
Pm
i=1 zi =
Pm
i=1 z
0
i. Then, for each i 2 I, we let
zi = zi   z0i satisfy, by construction, W (S0i; p; q)zi = W (S0i; p; q)zi and
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0.
Claim 3 p 2 , hence, ps e > , 8s 2 S, and ((p; q); [(xi ; zi )]), is an equilibrium.
Proof We show, rst, that p 2 P , i.e., ps 2 Ps, for every s 2 S. Indeed, from
Claim 2, p 2  := fp 2  : kp[s]k = 1; 8s 2 Sg and (xi ) 2 A. Let s 2 S be given. From
Claim 2, Assumption A1 and above, the relations V (p)s zi = V (p)s zi = ps (xi  ei)s
hold, for each i 2 I, withPmi=1 zi = 0. Thus, there exists i 2 I, such that V (p)s zi > 0,
and we let the reader check from Claim 2 and above that the triple (ps; (xi ); i) meets
the conditions of the denition of Ps. Thus, p 2 P and, from Claims 1 & 2, p 2 ,
hence, ps  e >  for each s 2 S, and
Pm
i=1(kxi k+ kzik) < r < r.
FromClaim 2 and above, the collection ((p; q); [(xi ; zi )]) belongs to (mi=1Bi(Si; p; q))
and meets Conditions (b)-(c) of Denition 2 of equilibrium. Assume, by contrapo-
sition, that it does not meet Condition (a). Then, there exist i 2 I and (xi; ezi) 2
Bi(Si; p
; q), such that ui(xi) > ui(xi ) and ezi 2 Z0?i . From Assumptions A3-A4, the
9
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above relations, kxi k+ kzik < r < r, and the convexity of Bi(p; q), we can take (xi; ezi)
close enough to (xi ; zi), so that (xi; ezi) 2 Bi(p; q), which contradicts Claim 2. 
Remark 3 The Assumption of separable utilities was necessary in Claim 1. This is
because, with asymmetric information, the no-arbitrage condition su¢ ces to bound
attainable consumptions, transfers and strategies with nominal, but not with nu-
meraire assets, due to a possible fall of the numeraire value in realizable states at
clearing market prices. With symmetric information, the reader will readily check
from the proofs above that separability is not required (since attainable allocations
are bounded) and that all the papers Claims hold if we replace, for each i 2 I, the
mapping, ui, by a preference correspondence, Pi, on (RL+)S
0
i , which is open, convex-
valued and such that (y + (1  )x) 2 Pi(x), whenever (; x; y) 2]0; 1] (RL+)S
0
i  Pi(x).
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